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decided to migrate and come back, the non-migrants would have earned more than twice the 
wages of return migrants. 
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1 Introduction
“Pehaps the most important topic that has yet to be addressed by the immigration literature
concerns the economic impact of immigration on the source country. A relatively large fraction of
the population of some countries has moved elsewhere. Moreover, this emigrant population is not
randomly selected, but is comp osed of workers w ho have a particular set of skills and attributes.”
(Borjas, G. 1999, p .1756)
This paper is an attempt to fill part of this void by oﬀering a comparison of return migrants in their
home country with those who chose to stay home. Human capital models of migration claim that those
who choose to migrate are more able and/or more motivated than those who choose to stay in their home
country (see Chiswick, 1999). If this is the case, immigrants are said to be positively selected compared to the
home p opulati on. B orjas (1987, 1991) has q uestioned t he widely agreed p osi tion that mi grants are p ositively
selected. He derived the condition under which immigrants coming from a country with more unequal
wage distribution than that prevailing in the host country may be negatively selected. In an extension
of this work, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) investigate the return migration of foreign-born individuals in
the United States and show how this may influence the type of self-selection characterising the migration
flows. Dustmann (1997) studies the optimal length of stay abroad and return behaviour of temporary
migrants in the framework of life-cycle analysis while Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) look at the activity
choice of return migrants. Bauer et al. (2002), studying Portuguese immigrants in Germany, conclude
that the German guest worker system succeeded in attracting positively self-selected immigrants in terms
of unobservable characteristics and compared to the native German workers. Chiquiar and Hanson (2002)
study the performance of Mexican immigrants in the United States and compare them to the non-migrant
Mexicans. Using the semi-parametric approach of DiNardo et al. (1996), they reject previous results found
in a more descriptive literature that Mexican immigrants in the US tend to be negatively selected in terms
of observable skills compared to the stayers.
Unlike the literature mentioned above, we focus on the wage eﬀect of return migration, comparing
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the performance of returnees to those who stayed in the home country. More specifically, we address the
question of the self-selection process of out- and then re-migration of the individuals who left the source
country and then returned home using the stayers (non-migrants) as the counter-factual. We address the
following questions: (i) Had they chosen not to migrate, what would be the performance of return migrants
compared to those who stayed? and (ii) What would be the performance of non-migrants had they decided
to migrate and return? To answer these questions, we use a sample of 691 Albanian individuals and use
two alternative methodologies, a selection model along the lines of Heckman (1979) and Lee (1982) and
a semi-parametric approach proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996). The first approach allows us to directly
address the questions but oﬀers only mean conditional earnings, while using the second approach we can
study the eﬀect of migration on the entire wage distribution.
Evidence suggests that a large number of migrants from Central and Eastern European Coutries fall
into the category of temporary (or guest) workers. For example in Greece, amongst the Albanian who
received a t emp orary white c ard in the regularisation programme in 1998, only 54 per cent pro ceeded to the second
phase of application one year later to obtain a permanent green card. In a survey realised in Albania by
the I nternational Organisati on f or Migration (IOM) i n 1992, 79 per cent of resp ondent s said t hey were ‘ likely’ or
‘very likely’ to mi grate f or a f ew months, 73 per cent for a few years and only 24 per cent wanted to settle p e rmanently
in another c ountry (IOM, 1995). Other evidence based on Eurobarometer shows that 50 per cent of Albanians
planned to emigrate for a short period only.1
Albania is a small (3.8 m inhabitants) and poor (with GDP/head of 1200 US$) transition country with
a dominant agri cultural sector (50 per cent of GDP) and f aci ng large emigration fl ows (similarly t o most other
transition countries). We may expect our results to apply also to other transition or developing countries.
To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of return migrants in their home labor market in the context
of a self-selection model. This is also the first study of such an issue in any transition economy (Albania
being by far the most aﬀected by migration). Furthermore, this is the first paper to use a semi-parametric
kernel density approach to study the impact of return migration.
1See Papapanagos and Sanfey(1998).
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We find support for the negative self-selection of return migrants compared to the native non-migrant
population (stayers). Our empirical results show that stayers would have performed much better than return
migrants had they chosen to migrate. We argue that for stayers the decision not to migrate comes from
the non-transferability of current skills due to language barrier, and also by the low added return to human
capital in the host country. Interpreting those results in the framework of our model, we find support to
a story of negative selection of the wave of return migrants compared to non-migrants. These results have
potential implications for migration policies of the host and the source countries.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Brief background on Albanian migration is presented in
Section 2, while the theoretical model is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data set and selection
of the variables. In Section 5, empirical methodology used to examine the issues raised in the theoretical
model is presented while the empirical results are given and discussed in Section 6. Concluding remarks and
potential policy implications appear in the last section.
2 Albanian Migration: A Brief Background
Perhaps because of its central location in Europe and its relative poverty, Albania has long been a country
of emigration. However, between 1945 and 1990 the state pursued a policy of social and economic isolation,
totally restricting any movement of its citizens out of its borders. During the transition period, a large
number of people, uncertain about the economic prospects of Albania, left the country. This was taking
place against the backdrop of rapid and radical political change that had already begun elsewhere in Central
and East European countries (CEEC) at the end of the 1980s. These events provided a further catalyst for
change in Albania and helped to put in motion the organisational skills and energy of those who had been
waiting for the right time to leave. Precise figures on Albanian immigrants are diﬃcult to gather due to the
potentially high number of non-declared (illegal) individuals either settled or working short time periods in
the host countries. For example, oﬃcially 4300 Albanians were issued a residence permit in 1997 in Greece.
But when the country adopted a regularisation programme (between November 1997 and May 1998) for
undocumented immigrants, 239,000 Albanian immigrants applied (see OECD, 2000). Hence, behind the
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oﬃcial figures, there are a rather large number of undocumented migrants not only in Greece but elsewhere
in Europe also, particularly in Italy. The Albanian Center for Economic Research (2002) estimates that at
least 15 per cent of the A lbanian p opulation is living abroad . Assuming t hat the ma jority of migrations are f or
work purpose, this means that 30 per cent of the Albanian work force (1.3 million) is abroad, which is by
far the highest proportion amongst the Central and East European economies.
A gradual improvement of the economic situation of Albania took place until the middle of 1996, owing
mainly to remittances and macroeconomic policies2 . These factors lessened, to a certain extent, the major
economic and social problems, which emerged as a result of high unemployment rates and big disparities in
wealth. However, these “positive factors” proved temporary as the domestically financed deficit increased
to almost 11 p e r cent of GDP, and inflation tripl ed to mor e than 17 p er cent by t he end of 1996. This was
exacerbated by the collapse of the pyramid schemes in early 1997, causing an estimated loss of savings of
about $1 billion.3
The worsening economic situation led to a second large outflow of individuals as employment prospects
in Albania dwindled for many. Emigration has an important impact in the reduction of unemployment in
the count ry. According to oﬃcial data, during 1998 unemployment in the country reach ed 17.7 per cent, with a
figure of 19. 1 per cent in the north-eastern areas where the l evel of emigration is lower and 13.4 per cent in the south
where mass emigration exists. Given that Albanian emigration is often driven by seasonal and temporary
employment, this has had an impact on the Albanian labour market. It is estimated that half the overall
number of emigrants are seasonally employed in the host countries.
According to data from the Albanian Ministry of Labour and Social Aﬀairs, during the last ten years,
Albanians have emigrated to about twenty European countries. However by far the largest number goes to
Greece followed by Italy. It may be the result of easier access to information about job availability and level
of wages in Greece, and also relatively lower transportation costs. The migration flow is amplified by the need
2Remittances have played a key role in the development process of not only Albania but other CEECs also. See Leon-Ledesma
and Piracha (2001) for an analysis of the role of remittances in selected CEECs.
3Pyramid schemes were companies that, by claiming to be engaged in profitable investments, attracted large and increasing
volumes of funds from private depositors with promises of dramatically high returns. In reality, however, depositors’ funds were
largely not used for solid investments, but served either to pay interest on existing deposits or were transferred by the schemes’
owners to bank accounts abroad. For a detailed analysis of the pyramid scheme crisis see Jarvis (2000).
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for a flexible non-unionised workforce for the informal economy in Greece. However, as mentioned before,
most of the migration appears to be temporary and for a specific purpose: to raise funds to setup enterprise
in Albania and/or to acquire skills by working in a relatively richer and established market economy.
3 Theoreti cal Framework
In earlier literature, migration has been modeled as a one shot move, where individuals take their decision
following an income maximising strategy to either migrate or stay in the origin area.4 More recently,
migration has been considered as a dynamic process within the lifetime expectations of workers (Djajic,
1989; Dustmann, 1997). In this context, there is evidence that migration is self-selective, i.e., those who
migrated would have done better regardless of whether or not they had gone abroad. Immigrants are often
found to be “more able and more highly motivated” than those who stay at home. In this study we question
this assertion. We analyse t he p erformance of return m igrants in t he source country, i.e. those who migrated
but then decided t o return to participate in the labour market of the source country.5
Using Albanian data, we want to know if migrants who returned home to Albania were selected from
the upper or lower part of the ability distribution in the source country. To conduct such an analysis we
investigate their performance once they return to Albania. The problem can be modelled by assuming income
maximising individuals who make a migration decision based on their expected income in the source and
the host countries net of any migration (and remigration) costs. More formally, we use a version of the Roy
(1951) theoretical model modified by Borjas (1987, 1991) and Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) to analyse this
problem. But in contrast with those papers, we analyse the impact of self-selection on the home country
rather than the host country.
Let the log earnings distribution in the source country be,
4See, for instance, Harris and Todaro (1970).
5We ignore the individuals who return to spend their retired life in the source country.
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ws = µs + ην (1)
where µs is the mean of log income in the source country, η is interpreted as the rate of return to skills in
the source country relative to that in the host country and is assumed to be known to the migrant and ν is
the random variable that measures deviations from the mean and is independently and normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2ν . Now let the log earnings facing the population of the source country when
they decide to migrate to the host country be,
wh = µh + ν + ² (2)
where µh is the mean income that migrants receive in the host country and ² is the random variable that
meas ures devi ations from the mean income in t he h ost country and is not k nown to the migrant , i.e.
it captures the luck and/or misinformation about the prospects in the host country, it is assumed to be
independently and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2² .
One of the main reasons for migration from Albania to EU countries is the significant wage gap between
the two countries. A temporary migration to Western Europe (primarily to Greece and Italy) oﬀers higher
paid employment and the potential to acquire skills, it also helps overcome any capital constraints that
an individual may face in the source country to start an enterprise.6 Therefore, migrants will only incur
migration costs if they expect that after spending a fraction δ of their working life in the host country they
can increase t heir earnings by some p e r cent, κ, when t hey return t o t heir home country. We as sume that
the parameters δ and κ are constant.
Workers in Albania, therefore, have the following option: residing in an EU country for a fraction of
the working life, followed by a permanent return to the source country. Ignoring discounting and using a
6M e sn a rd (1999) an alyses th e ch o ice o f a ctiv ity o f retu rn m ig rants ta kin g into a c co u nt cred it c o n straints in th e h o m e c ou ntry.
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first-oder approximation, the log earnings associated with this choice are given by:
wr = δwh + (1− δ) (ws + κ) (3)
Workers maximise their lifetime earnings net of all migration costs. For the migration motive to be
relevant, a person will only migrate if the expected earnings, due to skill acquisition abroad, upon return to
the source country, are greater than the earnings in the source country if the individual does not migrate,
net of both migration and remigration costs. Formally, we can write this as:
Ewr > ws + Cm + Cr (4)
where Cm and Cr are the migration and remigration costs respectively.7
Substituting eqs (1),(2) and (3) in (4), we get the condition under which a person will migrate (with the
intention of returning to the source country).
(1− η) ν >
¡
µs − µh + κ
¢
+
Cm + Cr − κ
δ (5)
Note that so far we have been assuming that a migrant must return to Albania as he is either required
to or has already decided at the time of migration to return home. However, to complete the picture, it
could be the case that the migrant could stay, either permanently or for a relatively longer period of time,
in the host country.8 In this circumstance, we need to set out the conditions under which (i) a person will
7T his in cludes b oth p ecun iary a nd n on -p ecuniary costs of m igration .
8As was discussed in Section2, there are some who successfully applied for a permanent stay in Greece.
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migrate regardless of future intentions and (ii) once migrated, the person will return to the source country
after s p ending a f racti on of time in t he host country, i.e. has n o incentive to stay in the host c ountry
permanently. The two conditions are respectively given as,
Ewh > ws + Cm (6)
and
Ewr > wh + Cr (7)
Eq (6) states that if the expected wage net of migration costs is greater than the wage in the source
country then it is better for a person to migrate. However, once there, a migrant will return to the source
country if the expected wage upon return, net of remigration costs, is greater than the migrant wage in the
host country. Substituting for the wages from the above equations, we get the following conditions under
which a person will migrate regardless of future intentions
(1− η) ν > µs − µh − Cm (8)
and will migrate and then return home after spending a fraction of time in the host country,
(1− η) ν <
¡
µs − µh + κ
¢
− C
r + Cm − ²
1− δ (9)
It is easier to explain the intuition behind eqs (5), (8) and (9) in a diagrammatic analysis and therefore it
9
will b e presented u sing Figures 1 and 2 b e low.
As discussed earlier, return migration arises because a temporary stay in the host country increases the
worker’s earning potential in the source country. Therefore migration is a self-selection process which is
based on the value of η in this model. The migration flow is composed of negatively selected individuals if
η > 1. In other words, people with lower than average skills in Albania will migrate to EU because in this
case only the lower skilled gain the most by moving to the host country. Amongst this cohort of negatively
selected individuals, only the more able return to the origin country after a spell in the host country. This
case is shown in Figu re 1 where we draw the earn ings f unction w s and wh (net of migrati on costs) as t hick
lines and w r (net of migration and remi gration c ost) as dotted lines.9 As suming that skills are n ot p erfectly
transferable across borders, there are gains from moving for individuals with lower skills, whereas those with
relatively higher skills are better oﬀ staying in Albania (in terms of eq 8, to satisfy the inequality condition
it must be the case that µh > µs − Cm, and therefore it is more favorable for the individual to migrate to
the host country. Amongst the lower skilled migrants, only those who have relatively higher skills will face
incentive s to col lect the gains from migration and return to Albania (region A)).
If η < 1, however, people with skills higher than the average level will migrate. And amongst this pool
of positively selected migrants only the relatively less able will find it worthwhile to return after a spell in
the host country (region B).
4 Dat a a nd Ch oi c e of Va ri abl e s
Data used in this paper is based on direct interviews of 1500 individuals in all regions of Albania which were
conducted during the period March 1998-January 1999.10 Names were randomly selected in the district
registers. Numbers attributed by districts are proportional to the size of the district, so the sample is
9Where η is the slope of the earnings function in Albania relative to the slope of the earnings function that migrants face in
the host country.
10This data was collected within the framework of Phare-ACE project.
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regionally representative. No precise question was asked regarding present living location and therefore we
could not be certain that some individuals are not actually still working abroad but have been interviewed
while taking time oﬀ in Albania. In order to select only the “real” returnees, we restricted our analysis to
those who had migrated and came back at least 2 months before the day of interview. Moreover we wanted
to avoid the cross-border or seasonal migrants, i.e. those who spend some time of the year abroad and then
come back home for the rest of the year. These individuals are defined as persistent migrants and most
probably have diﬀerent characteristics and preferences than the population we want to study. Therefore
we selected only those individuals who live on earned income, excluding all those who live on remittances
(transfers), unemployment benefits, unearned income (i.e. personal savings supposedly earned abroad) or
social assistance. We also removed pensioners, housewives and students. Imposing these restrictions restrict
of course the scope of our analysis, but it reflects our emphasis on the eﬀect of (return-) migration on the
source country labour market.11 Of the 1500 original interviews, selection of valid answers led us to a final
sample of 594 wage earners, aged between 16 and 65 (see Appendix, Table 1 for details on the selection).
This high percentage of migrants in the population looks excessive but is in line with previous evidence on
Albania.12
Focusing on migrants, we first have to mention that less than 30 per cent migrated for a total period of
less than a year, approximately the same percentage migrated for 1 to 2 years, 20 per cent for 2 to 3 years,
less than 8 p er cent f or 3 t o 4 years, and 7 p ercent f or 4 t o 5 years, while only another 7 p e rcent migrated
for more t han 5 ye ars. Lo oking at t he nu mb er of ti mes indivi duals migrated, we find that 53 p er cent m oved
abroad only once, 32 p er cent did it twice and only 11 p e rcent did it more often. And of t hose who migrated
only once, more that 70 p e r cent did so for more t han one ye ar whereas those who migrated twice have
an average spell abroad of 13 months each time. For those who migrated three times, their average spell
abroad is just over ten months. These findings are consistent with the selection of individuals who are return
migrants and not persistent (or seasonal) migrants. Average characteristics are displayed in Table 1.
11 Individuals out of the labour force are diﬀerentiated as pensioners, housewifes, students, unemployed. Compared to those
in clu ded in our p ap er, they a re yo un ger, less often m arried, less likely to live in cities. Those who have migrated are mainly
unem ployed and students, those w ho have n o m ig ration exp erien ce are m ostly stu d nts or p ension ers.
12 See Papapanagos and Vickerman (2000).
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Table 1: Means of the sample
Tot. sample Returned Stayers (390)
Migrants (204)
log(wage) 4.446 4.508 4.413
(0.644) (0.738) (0.587)
education 13.973 13.574 14.182
(2.431) (2.363) (2.443)
age 37.470 34.843 38.845
(10.130) (9.022) (10.414)
male 0.663 0.848 0.567
married 0.714 0.676 0.733
Occupations:
Managers 0.120 0.113 0.123
Lowe r m an. 0.108 0.088 0.118
Skilled worker 0.222 0.211 0.228
Self-employed 0.207 0.289 0.164
O ther paid job 0.253 0.206 0.277
Clerical, unskilled, farmer 0.091 0.093 0.090
Pa id in for. currency 0.022 0 .044 0.010
Live in cities 0.411 0.466 0.382
Live North 0.146 0.123 0.159
Muslim 0.574 0.574 0.574
Numb. of dependents 0.958 1.123 0.872
(1.138) (1.157) (1.120)
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The hourly wages converted into US dollars13 are 0.72 US$ for the total sample, $0.81 for return migrants
and $0.67 for stayers. The Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) give the monthly mean income of public
sector workers as 10, 000 Le ks for 1998 (18 per cent of the lab or force) whi le in our sample using ave rage mont hly
working hours we find an average monthly income of 15,351 Leks. We expect this diﬀerence to be due
to individuals in the private sector earning more than those in the public sector (unfortunately we do not
know whether indi vid uals work in t he pub lic or th e priva te sector in our dataset). In our s ample, the ave rage
migrant is younger, slightly less qualified, less likely to be married and more likely to be male. The diﬀerences
in average level of education and age are not statistically significantly. Looking at occupation, we note that
the largest diﬀerence is in self-employed work: return migrants are nearly twice as likely to be self-employed
than the stayers. We observe nearly identical proportion of managers in the stayers and return migrants
sub-p opulations ( 12.3 per cent vs 11. 3 per cent). We will discuss t hese two variables in more detail in the e mpir ical section,
as they are central to our analysis. Other noticeable diﬀerence is the larger proportion of returnees who live
in big c ities ( 46 per cent compared to 39 per cent).
5 Empirical Methodolog y
Two metho ds are used in order to investigate t he issues pres ented in the theoretical model. We begin by
making use of a selection model as proposed by Lee (1978, 1982) and applied to migration by Nakosteen and
Zimmer (1980). The model can be summarised by the following three equations:
wri = βrxi + ²ri (10)
wsi = βs
0
xi + ²si (11)
m∗i = γ0zi + ui (12)
13At the average market rate available for the three quarters of the interviews period (II, III, IV, 1998), it was 148.8 Lek/$
(source: International Financial Statistics, IMF, 2001).
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The wri is the hourly log wage of individuals who migrated at least once and came back to Albania and w
s
i
is the log hourly wage of those who stayed in the country. These hourly wages are explained by a matrix of
socio-economic covariates such as education, age and its square, dummy variables for gender, marital status
(and its interaction with the gender variable), occupation (managers, lower manager, skilled worker, self-
employed, other paid job, and the reference clerical, unskilled and farmers) and a dummy for being paid in
a foreign currency.14 The third equation describes the decision to choose to migrate. The latent variable m∗i
is the diﬀerence between benefit and cost from migration (monetary and psychological). It is not observed,
but we know when the individual has decided to migrate, so we can define:
For migrants mi = 1 iﬀ m∗i ≥ 0 (13)
and for non-migrants mi = 0 iﬀ m∗i < 0 (14)
Two sets of variables are used to explain the decision to migrate: those included in the wage equations
and those not included in them. The second set is needed to identify the model without relying entirely on
the normality assumption. To begin with the first one, education is introduced as a variable for the probit
migration decision and the wage equation, as this characteristic may be explaining both the migration
decision and the wage equation. Age should be negatively associated with the migration decision as older
individuals are expected to be more attached to local amenities than younger ones. Furthermore, men are
more likely to move than women, a common feature of all studies on migration. The opposite is true for
married individuals. We also add an interaction term between gender and marital status as the eﬀect of
these variables might be correlated.
As additional variables in the migration equation that are not included in the wage equation, we introduce
first the number of dependents within the household with the assumption that tighter liquidity constraints
on the household might exert, all else constant, a positive impact on the migration decision. The second one
is the s ize of t he city wh ere t he indi vid ual is cu rrent ly l i vin g. A ss umi ng th at t he indi vidu al return ed to the
14We have introduced a variable for being paid in foreign currency as we may expect diﬀerent pay settings for people who
work for international organisations or multinational firms than those who work for domestic firms. We observe those who have
b e e n a b r o a d a t le a s t o n c e a r e m o r e like ly to b e h ir e d by su ch fi rm s ( 4 per cent of re tu rn m igra nts co m p a red to only 1 per cent of the s tayers).
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place that he/she left when migrating, we expect people living in big cities to be more likely to migrate as
family ties might be more relaxed in an urban environment as compared to a rural one. As other identifying
variable, we introduce the fact of living in the more mountainous North of the country.15Another variable
expected to influence migration but not wage is religion. There are two main religions in Albania, Islam
and Ortho dox Christian. Muslims, wh o c omprise 70 per cent of th e p opulation, are exp ected to face higher (non-
p e cuniary) costs of m igrati on as opp osed t o t he minori ty Albanian Ortho d ox and Roman Catholics ( 20 per cent
and 10 per cent of the p opulation resp ectively). These c o s ts cover t he r elat ive l y h ighe r l eve l of d iﬃculty muslims
might face in practising their faith in a non-muslim country and also the increased diﬃculty of assimilation
in countries with diﬀerent religions. We therefore introduced a “muslim” dummy to measure these increased
costs of migration for muslims.
The following two conditional wages are defined as the outcome for those who have already made the
choice,
E(wri |mi = 1) = βr
0
xi +E(²ri |ui ≥ −γ0zi) = βr
0
xi + σerρru
φ(γ0zi)
Φ(γ0zi)
E(wsi |mi = 0) = βs
0
xi +E(²si|ui < −γ0zi) = βs
0
xi + σesρsu[−
φ(γ0zi)
1− Φ(γ0zi)
]
In order to address the questions given in the introduction, we need the conditional probabilities for
migrants, had they chosen not to migrate and similarly the conditional probabilities of stayers, had they
chosen to migrate. Following Maddala (1983), these are given as:
15As mentioned in Section 2, migration flows originating from the Northern regions of Albania are lower. This can be
explained by the increased distance from Greece and/or by more uncertainties surrounding the outcomes on the Greek labour
market.
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E(wsi |mi = 1) = βr
0
xi +E(²ri|ui ≥ −γ0zi) = βr
0
xi + σerρru
φ(γ0zi)
Φ(γ0zi)
(15)
E(wri |mi = 0) = βs
0
xi +E(²ri |ui < −γ0zi) = βs
0
xi + σesρsu[−
φ(γ0zi)
1− Φ(γ0zi)
] (16)
Equation (15) is the conditional wage of stayers, had they chosen to migrate and equation (16) is the
conditional wage of migrants, had they chosen to stay. Where Φ(.) and φ(.) stand, respectively, for the
cumulative and density function of the standard normal, σer and σes are the variances of the error terms
of the wage equations for migrants and stayers respectively, and ρsu and ρru are the correlations between
the stayers and migrants error term, respectively, and that of the migration decision equation. There is
no agreement in the literature as whether these conditional wages should be preferred over the marginal
distributions. So in the section devoted to the results we give the marginal eﬀects as well. Average wage
diﬀerentials can be given for diﬀerent groups of workers and at diﬀerent ages and levels of education.
So far we have only been able to give average earning diﬀerences whereas the distributional impact of
migration might also be of interest to answer the questions posed earlier. One way of identifying the eﬀect
of return migration would be to answer the following question: Which density function would prevail if the
individual characteristics of migrants had been similar to those of stayers and they had been paid according
to the wage schedule observed for stayers? This is one counterfactual density. It is the wage density that
would prevail if everybody were receiving stayers’ wages. But another way of studying the eﬀect of migration
could be to construct a density that would prevail if everybody received migrants’ wages. Here the question
is: What density would prevail if the characteristics of stayers were similar to those of migrants and they
were paid according to the wage schedule of migrants?
Following DiNardo et al. (1996), we can write down these two counterfactuals by the following steps. First
we represent the observed density of wages for stayers as the integral of the density of their wages conditional
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on an obs erve d characteris ti c z over the d istribution of these characteristics:
g(w|m = 0) =
Z
fs(w|z)h(z|m = 0)dz (17)
and similarly for migrants, we have:
g(w|m = 1) =
Z
fr(w|z)h(z|m = 1)dz (18)
We know that the required densities, i.e. the density that would prevail if everybody were receiving
stayers wages is:
gs(w) =
Z
fs(w|z)h(z)dz
and the density that would prevail if everyone were receiving migrants wages is:
gr(w) =
Z
fr(w|z)h(z)dz
Following Bayes’ Law, these densities can be rewritten as16 :
gs(w) =
Z
θ1(z)fs(w|z)h(z|m = 0)dz (19)
16The property used is: h(z) = h(z|m=0)prob(m=0)
prob(m=0|z) for the stayers and similarly for the migrants h(z) =
h(z|m=1)prob(m=1)
prob(m=1|z) .
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gr(w) =
Z
θ2(z)fr(w|z)h(z|m = 1)dz (20)
Note that equations (19) and (20) are similar to equations (17) and (18) except for the weights θ1(z) and
θ2(z) which are respectively:
θ1(z) = prob(m = 0)
prob(m = 0|z)
and
θ2(z) = prob(m = 1)
prob(m = 1|z)
θ1(z) can be empirically calculated since prob(m = 0) is simply the proportion of stayers in our sample and
prob(m = 0|z) is the probability of being a migrant given individual characteristics which can be estimated
by a probit (similar reasoning applies for θ2(z) ). Using these weights, we apply weighted kernel densities to
the sample of stayers and migrants to estimate the densities of both counterfactual distributions.
6 Resul ts and Discussion
6.1 Parametric estimates
Following Ham et al. (2001), we conduct tests on the variables that identify the selection into migrants and
stayers. More precisely, we introduce these variables in the wage regressions to check if they are significantly
diﬀerent from zero. If they are significant we exclude them from the entire model, and if they are not
significant, we include them in the probit and not the wage estimations. We investigate with four variables:
two regional i.e., whether individuals are living in cities and in the North of the country and two personal
characteristics: religion (being a muslim) and number of dependents in the household. We expect these
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variables to aﬀect the migration decision and to be uncorrelated with the error term in the wage equations.
We compute Chi-Square tests of their individual and joint significance in the probit and Wald test of the
individual and joint significance in the wage equations. The four variables are individually and jointly
insignificant in the wage equation for stayers (the individual tests all have a p-value higher than 0.17, and
the joint significance is rejected with a p-value of 0.25). For migrants, coeﬃcients for each variable are
insignificant (except for living in cities), and test for their joint significance gives a p-value of 0.075 (without
the ”living in cities” variable, p-value is 0.45). Instruments are jointly significant (p-value of 0 to the second
decimal place) in the probit, and they are all significantly diﬀerent from 0 individually except the ”Muslim”
vari able (p-value of 0.72). We give i n Table 2 the maximum likeliho o d estimates of the migration mo del
with all four identifying variables (second selection rule). For comparison, we provide also in the Appendix
estimates of wage equations using Lee (1978) endogenous switching model, with wage equations explained
only by education and age and then adding progressively more exogenous variables (Appendix, Table 2 and
3). We also give in the Appendix, Lee’s estimates with only regional characteristics in the probit (first
selection rule, Appendix Table 4) and then adding religion and the number of dependents (second selection
rule, Appendix Table 5).
6.1.1 Comments on estimates
Note that the estimates for the diﬀerent estimations are rather similar. Generally the coeﬃcients for the
stayers’ wage equations take the expected sign and are statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero. One
more year of education leads to approximately a 4 per cent increase in the hourly wage, age is introduced
to measure labor market experience and shows that each subsequent year gives approximately a 8.5 per
cent increase in the dependent variable. The age profile is concave. One coeﬃcient of interest is the male
dummy which is negative and not significant. This result has to be interpreted in the context of an ex-
communist country where work was c ompulsory for b oth men and women and wages wer e set at the national
leve l. Co eﬃcients for o ccupations take the exp ected sign with managers earning 66 per cent more th an th e omitt ed
category ( the group: clerical , unskilled and farmers). The premi um f or self-employment is 52 per cent.
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Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimates, second selection rule
Variables Stayers Migrants Migration
Constant 1.776 (.623) 4.92 (1.003) .617 (.440)
education .0405 (.013) .032 (.028) -.049 (.025)
age .0850 (.033) -.028 (.054) -.036 (.007)
age squ. -.094 (.040) .0595 (.071)
male -.0613 (.145) -.533 (.304) .979 (.133)
married -.2636 (.141) -.110 (.333) .219 (.145)
male*married -.0110 (.154) -.011 (.332)
Occupations:
Managers .6562 (.171) 1.003 (.250)
Lower man. .2351 (.174) .608 (.309)
Skilled worker .3588 (.151) .303 (.238)
Self-employed .5171 (.152) .736 (.221)
Other paid job .3007 (.149) .285 (.230)
For. currency -.2696 (.272) .869 (.180)
Live in cities .327 (.115)
Live North -.345 (.148)
Muslim -.009 (.113)
Dependents .0690 (.044)
σem .875 (.074)
σes .5773 (.029)
ρmu -.806 (.087)
ρsu -.5678 (.142)
Notes: In the first selection rule only regional variables are introduced in the probit,
in the second selection rule, personal variable (muslim and dependents) are added.
Interestingly for return migrants, education and age are not significantly diﬀerent from zero.17 However,
for migrants, returns to being a manager, self-employed and a “lower” manager are significant and higher
than for stayers. Skilled return migrant workers earn less that skilled stayers. Managers earn between 90 and
100 per cent (depending on the estimation, see Table 2 and Appendix, Tables 2 to 5) more than the omitted
category.18 The premium for self-employed returners is between 69 and 73 per cent. These results are quite
interesting as they suggest that returns to returning take the form of increased earnings in terms of (i)
higher positions in the job ladder and (ii) becoming self-employed.19 Better educated and more experienced
migrants are not earning higher hourly wages when they return. We observe also a negative and significant
sign of the education variable in the migration decision, therefore migration is not associated with higher
educated individuals. As the theoretical model shows, individuals choose to migrate if the relative rewards
17This result is similar to Ham et al. (2001), who found lower return to education for internal migrants in the United States.
18The omitted category is clerical, unskilled, farmer.
19Overall a Chi-Square test of the joint significance of the occupational variables gives a p-value of zero to the fourth decimal
place for stayers and migrants.
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to their skills are higher in the host country and then choose to return if they expect the rewards (promotion
and/or higher wages etc) to be higher than before in the home country due to newly acquired skills and/or
through saving acquired abroad. Therefore returns to skills take the form of access to better jobs in the
career ladder but not through return to formal skill (education and labor market experience). Individuals
who chose to migrate and then returned face the prospect of access to high paid jobs that do not reward
formal training (years of education and lab or m arke t e xp erience). I n our data set, we found that 10 per cent of the
self-employed and the managers used their savings accumulated abroad to set up a business. This result can
therefore b e related to the study of Mesnard ( 1999) wh o mo dels return migration as a way of overcoming
constraints of the credit market in the home country. In our context, we observe that individuals who lack
formal qualifications required for higher paid jobs tend to migrate to overcome their initial disadvantage.
This strategy proves particularly successful as the average earnings of return migrants are higher than those
of stayers.
Looking at the unobserved characteristics, the signs of the corrections for selectivity allow us to draw
interesting conclusions. For instance the correction for sample selection in the migrant’s wage equation is not
significant when using a two-step approach (Appendix, Table 4 and 5). The maximum likelihood, however,
gives a significant and negative estimate for the correlation coeﬃcient. For stayers, the three estimations
give a significant and negative sign for the coeﬃcient of the selectivity variable ([− φ(γ
0zi)
1−Φ(γ0zi) ]), which means
that the truncation eﬀect is positive. Using the framework of a Roy (1951) self-selection model as formalised
by Maddala(1983) and others, this indicates that expected earnings of those who choose to migrate may be
lower than that of a random individual from the entire sample for given characteristics. And conversely, the
expected earnings of those who stayed are higher than the expected earnings of a random individual from
the sample. There is positive selection for stayers and support for negative selection of the migrants. We
expand this issue in the following section where we directly address the question whether the stayers would
have performed as well as migrants, had they decided to migrate.
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6.1.2 Expected earnings and self-selection
Mean income is higher for migrants t han for stayers by 9 log p oints, so approx imately by 9 p er cent ( see
Table 3). Lo oking at t he two c ount erfactuals, c alcu lated u sing simple OLS e stimations, we n ote t hat had
they chosen to migrate, stayers’ earnings would have been higher than the mean income of migrants. The
mean earnings of migrants, had they chosen to stay, would have been ‘just’ higher than the mean earnings
of stayers. However, these estimates are probably biased as they do not take into account the potential
self-selection of individuals in either sub-population. Therefore we correct for potential self-selection bias
and present the results in columns 2 to 6 of Table 3 which are based on Table 2 and Appendix, Table 4 and 5.
We give for each estimation, the mean incomes based on the marginal (E(wr) = βr
0
x and E(ws) = βs
0
x)20
and the conditional (E(wr|m = 1) and E(ws|m = 0)) expected wage rate. Marginal distribution should
be used for inference on potential migration and conditional distribution should be used for inference on
realised mi gration ( Maddala, 1983). I f we c ompare rows 1 and 2 in Table 3, we observe t hat migrant s made
the correct decision in choosing to migrate, as their income is higher than what they would earn by staying.
Comparing their performance, had they not migrated, with the performance of stayers (rows 2 and 3), we
note that the counterfactual mean income of migrants is always lower than the mean income of stayers. This
shows that the performance of migrants, if they had stayed, would have been worse than that of the stayers.
As for the stayers, comparing rows 3 and 4 it can be seen that their mean income would have been higher,
had they migrated. The order of this advantage is .17 and 1.16 log points using the marginal and conditional
expected means respectively of the Maximum likelihood estimation. In the framework of our theoretical
model, we observe that more skilled individuals do not migrate if their potential earnings net of migration
costs are lower in the host countries compared to their wage at home. Our results give rise to a story of the
more able/skilled individuals in Albania facing higher assimilation costs in the host labour markets. This
may come from the diﬃculty to practice their profession in a foreign language. This, for instance, would
apply to such professions as medical doctors, lawyers or teachers.21 For the less skilled, such costs may be
20We choose the term ”marginal” rather than ”unconditional” following Maddala(1983) and Van der Gaag and Vijverberg
(19 88).
21Our data set oﬀer some help in identifying this increased assimilation costs faced by the stayers. They are asked to give
the m ain reason w hy they did not m igrate am ongst eight p ossible answers. T he resu lts are as follow s: ”fam ily” (16 per cent), fear
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Table 3: Estimated mean hourly wage for return migrants and stayers
OLS Endogenous switching, Lee(1978) Maximum likelihood
First sel. rule Sec. sel. rule Sec.sel rule
marg. cond. marg. cond. marg. cond.
Migrants (204 cases)
Mean
income 4.5 4.96 (4.5) 4.73 (4.5) 5.15 4.5
Had they
stayed (counterfact.) 4.42 3.91 3.21 4.02 3.47 4.20 3.90
Stayers (390 cases)
Mean
income 4.41 4.04 4.41 4.13 4.41 4.26 4.41
Had they
migrated (counterfact.) 4.49 5.10 (5.34) 4.80 (4.91) 5.32 5.66
Notes: Marg. is for: E(wr) = βr0x and E(ws) = βs0x and Cond. is for:E(wr|m = 1)
and E(ws|m = 0). In the first selection rule only regional variables are
entered in the probit, (App. Table 4), in the second selection rule religion
and number of dependents are added in the probit (Table 2 and App. Table 5).
much lowe r as t he job s p erformed in t he h ost countri es d o  not require fluency of the foreign language.
These results lend support to a story of negatively selected return-migrants as depicted in the theoretical
analysis in fig 1.
of lo sing the cu rrent jo b (12 per cent), not having a v isa (11 per cent), love fo r the hom e country (9 per cent), on ly at the six th p lace com es the
fi nancial cost (6 per cent), th en b eing to o old (5 per cent) and health reasons (2 per cent). N o one chose the risk of losing so cial assistance.
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6.2 Results using semi-parametric estimates
We now investigate the entire density of hourly wages. All graphs presented here give estimates calculated
with a Gaussian kernel function. We used the Silverman (1986, eq. 3.31) procedure to select the optimal
bandwith, its value lies at 0.147. Kernel estimates for the entire sample, for the stayers and for the migrants,
are d isplayed i n Fi gure 3. In Figure 4, densities f or the total sampl e are decomp osed into the weighted sum
of the d ensities of mi grants and staye rs. We s imply multi ply t he sub-gr oup densities of Figure 3 by t he
sub-group population shares.
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Figure 3: Kernel densities
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Figure 4: Weighted densities
Figure 3 shows that migrants tend to account for a larger part of the total distribution at higher hourly
wages. There is clearly a clustering of the distribution at higher wages for those who have migrated and leads
to a small "b ump" at the t op of the overal l d istribution. These observations b ased on the raw distributions
are interesting but cannot reveal the real eﬀect of migration as we compare subpopulations with rather
diﬀerent characteristics. We already know from table 1 that migrants tend to be less educated, younger and,
more often, male.
The diﬀerent curves may be due more to these individual characteristics than to migration. So we have
to go a step further in comparing populations with similar characteristics. We can do this in two ways,
either in displaying the distribution of wages as if everyone were paid the stayers’ wage, or in graphing the
distribution of wages as if everyone were paid the migrants’ wage. More precisely, in the first case we answer
the following question: Which density function would prevail if individual characteristics of migrants had
been similar to those of stayers and they had been paid according to the wage schedule observed for stayers?
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We d o t h a t i n Figure 5 which gives t his hyp othetica l count erfactual density together with the density of
the entire population. The diﬀerence between the two curves can be interpreted as the eﬀect of (return)
migration. The curve called the density without migration is calculated using formula 20. We give in the
Appendix (fig. A1 to A4), the propensity scores of the probit and also the weights θ1(z) and θ2(z). Note that
the c ounterfactual density in Figure 5 is rather similar t o the densi ty of t he entire samp le. H ad th e migrant s
been paid the same as the stayers and their characteristics would have been similar, we would have observed
a slightly diﬀerent density function. Mainly the small cluster at the top of the distribution disappears and
is compensated by a shift of the curve to the right just after the mode of the distribution. So interpreting
the eﬀect of migration as the diﬀerence between the two curves, we can say that its eﬀect is rather reduced
at the bottom of the distribution and can explain the bump at around 6 log hourly Lek.
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Figure 5: Hypoth. density without migration
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Figure 6: Hypoth. density with migration
Figure 6 gives complementary information as here the reference is the migrants sub-population. The
counterfactual curve is now the density that would have prevailed if the characteristics of migrants were
similar to those of stayers. This would have resulted in the density function lying to the right of the actual
one. This counterfactual distribution is nearly bi-modal, with a second (lower) mode at higher wage. These
figures give more support to the negative selection of return migrants. In particular, we observe here that
the eﬀect of migration would have been much stronger had the migrants characteristics been more similar
to those of stayers.
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6. 3 Resul t s wi t h di saggregat ed charac t eri s t i c s
In this section we want to check that the above results, which are based on the mean income of all individuals,
still hold if the individuals are disaggregated by qualification levels, age and type of employment (self- or wage
employment). Using the maximum likelihood estimates, we therefore calculate the marginal and conditional
expected hourly wages for three diﬀerent characteristics: Those with more and less than 14 years of schooling,
those more and less than 30 years of age, and for wage and self-employed workers (see Appendix, Table 6).22
The first cell of first column of Table 4 shows that the stayers, had they migrated, would have earned 1.17
log points more than the migrants actual earning. And the first cell of column 3 shows that the migrants,
had they decided to stay, would have earned .42 points less than the actual earnings of stayers. These results
strongly suggest that the sub-population of stayers is composed of better performers. For all decomposition
of the population, by age, employment and level of education, stayers would have performed better, had they
migrated. We observe that highly educated (young and old) stayers would have gain more, had they decided
to move than low educated and compared to similar migrants. Also highly educated migrants (young and
old) would have lost more, had they stayed, compared to stayers with same education level.
Table 4: Absolute advantage for diﬀerent characteristics
Stayers Migrants
col.1 col.2 col.3 col.4
low educ. high educ. low educ. high educ.
wage 1.17 1.26 -.42 -.54
self 1.12 1.12 -.50 -.54
young 1.08 1.46 -.29 -.45
old 1.04 1.34 -.42 -.57
Notes: Absolute advantage is computed as the diﬀerence between
log hourly wages of stayers (migrants) and the counterfactual
mean earnings of migrants (stayers).
Another area of interest is to look at the individual comparative advantage for each sub-population. Here,
comparison is made between what the individuals would have earned (had they decided otherwise) with what
they are actually earning. So the first cell of first column of Table 5 shows that low educated stayers are
22Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) showed that return migrants choosing between self-employment or wage sector tend to
experience diﬀerent outcomes when they return.
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Table 5: Comparative advantage for diﬀerent characteristics
Stayers Migrants
col.1 col.2 col.3 col.4
low educ. high educ. low educ. high educ.
wage -1.24 -1.37 .59 .65
self -1.21 -1.09 .69 .51
young -1.32 -1.50 .53 .73
old -1.19 -1.35 .57 .58
Notes: Comparative advantage are computed as the diﬀerence
between mean log hourly wages and the counterfactual
for each population.
earning 1.24 log points less than what they would be earning, had they decided to move. And the first cell
of column 3 implies that the less qualified migrants earn .59 than if they had chosen not to migrate. The
results confirm that for each type of characteristics migrants made the right decision. However, as mentioned
in the previous section, the stayers must face unobserved costs of migration, which prevent them to migrate
despite the fact that they would have been financially much better in doing so. Therefore the results found
earlier on the aggregated sub-population (Table 3) are not aﬀected when we take into account the diﬀerent
characteristics.
7 Conclusion
Large flows of migrants have left the Albanian labour market following the collapse of Communism in 1990.
These migrants often come back home after a spell abroad. This predominantly return behaviour of Albanian
migration oﬀers an interesting case study to investigate the eﬀect of migration on the source country labour
market. Using a sample of 694 individuals active on the Albanian labour market, we compare those who
returned after a spell abroad (204 individuals) with those who never migrated (390 individuals).
We have investigated the negative or positive selection of return migrants by comparing their performance
in the source country with those of the stayers in the framework of a Roy theoretical model of self-selection.
We found support for the negative selection of return migrants. Using counterfactual analysis, we found
that, had the stayers decided to migrate and return, they would have earned a higher hourly wage (in
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the order of .17 to 1.09 log points) than the return migrants. Applying the semi-parametric approach of
DiNardo et al. (1996), it was shown that return migration results in a slight rightward shift of the wage
dis tri bution in Alb ania. Howe ver, had t he ch aracterist ics of migrants b een more s imil ar to those of s tayers,
the wage distribution would have markedly moved to the right. We interpret this result as further supporting
evidence for the negative selection of return migrants compared to the stayers. We explain the choice of
stayers by their higher costs of migration. Being on average more skilled, they would face higher assimilation
costs in the host countries such as the knowledge of the host country language and the recognition of their
formal training acquired at home. For typical low skilled migrants such costs are much lower as they are
expected to be active in menial jobs where few contacts and training are required. We also observed that
rewards to the typical human capital variables, age and education, are not statistically significant in the
home country labour market for the return migrants whereas the opposite prevails for the stayers.
This paper is the first to investigate the self-selection process characterising the flows of return migrants
in the context of the source country labour market. Albania is a relatively poor and small country with
a dominant agricultural sector typical of a large number of Central and Eastern European and developing
countries. We may expect our results to apply to similar countries as well.
As potential policy implications, we may mention the increased hourly wage of returnees due to their spell
abroad, despite them appearing to be negatively selected. This is clearly beneficial for the source country
economy, especially as a large proportion of the returnees appear to choose to set up successfully as self-
employed. It could therefore be inferred from this behaviour that credit constraints play an important role
in the decision to leave, work and save abroad, and then return to participate in the local economy. It seems,
therefore, that better access to credit market will be helpful in promoting higher pay-oﬀ to self-employment
in Albania.
For the host countries, a common worry has been the fear of the adverse eﬀect of large flows of unskilled
immigrants entering their labour markets. It appears that, at least in the case of Albania, a majority of
immigrants choose the short-term (or guest worker) option. Nevertheless, it may be advisable for countries
fearing these adverse eﬀects to implement short-term work permits to be able to better monitor immigration
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flows. Finally, host countries could as well try to lessen the incoming flows by favoring the creation of
micro-credit institutions in the source countries.
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Stayers
n
b.
 
ob
s.
prob(m=1|z)0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
0
10
20
30
40
50
Figure A2: Estimated prop. scores
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Figure A3: Est. prop.scores and weights (θ2(z))
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Figure A4: Est. prop. scores and weights (θ 1 (z ))
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Table A1: Sample Selection Crite ria
1500 Total numbers of interviews
-37 Not reporting their age
-25 Individuals less than 15 or more than 65 years old
-460 Retired, not active, student, unemployed, missing occupation
-33 Not reporting years of education
-186 Not reporting earned income
-71 Missing or non valid working hours
- 88 Migrants returned since less than two months
- 6 Hourly wage higher than the 99th percentile
594 204 return migrants and 390 stayers
Ta b l e A2 : M i g r a n t s , d iﬀerent sp ecification of the wage function, dep. variabl e: Lw, s econd s election rul e
Variables Coeﬀ. St.-Err. Coeﬀ. St.-Err. Coeﬀ. St.-Err. Coeﬀ. St.-Err.
Constant 4.224 (0.888) 4.455 (0.945) 4.477 (0.969) 4.536 (0.912)
education 0.045 (0.023) 0.049 (0.024) 0.050 (0.024) 0.025 (0.026)
age -0.018 (0.047) -0.018 (0.047) -0.006 (0.050) -0.030 (0.047)
age squ./100 0.029 (0.068) 0.034 (0.063) 0.023 (0.065) 0.050 (0.061)
male -0.183 (0.251) -0.380 (0.372) -0.234 (0.345)
married -0.241 (0.312) -0.038 (0.300)
male*marr. 0.180 (0.319) -0.014 (0.304)
Managers 0.900 (0.235)
Lower Man 0.571 (0.238)
Skilled work 0.299 (0.198)
Self-emp. 0.691 (0.188)
Other job 0.261 (0.199)
For.curr. 0.686 (0.239)
Lambda -0.099 (0.182) -0.286 (0.316) -0.377 (0.344) -0.251 (0.319)
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Ta b l e A3 : S t a y e r s , d iﬀerent s p ecifi cation of the wage functi on, d ep. variable: Lw, second selection rule
Variables Coeﬀ. St.-err. Coeﬀ. St.-err. Coeﬀ. St.-err. Coeﬀ. St.-err.
Constant 2.106 (0.486) 2.129 (0.512) 1.371 (0.576) 1.487 (0.560)
education 0.055 (0.012) 0.054 (0.013) 0.055 (0.014) 0.045 (0.015)
age 0.067 (0.023) 0.067 (0.023) 0.104 (0.026) 0.089 (0.025)
age squ./100 -0.078 (0.029) -0.079 (0.030) -0.112 (0.031) -0.029 (0.031)
male 0.017 (0.124) -0.057 (0.169) -0.170 (0.166)
married -0.243 (0.122) -0.293 (0.120)
male*marr. -0.058 (0.131) -0.031 (0.126)
Managers 0.676 (0.129)
Lower Man 0.237 (0.127)
Skilled work 0.377 (0.109)
Self-emp. 0.548 (0.116)
Other job 0.322 (0.112)
For.curr. -0.259 (0.267)
Lambda -0.329 0.124 -0.298 0.246 -0.543 0.271 -0.599 (0.265)
Table A4: Endogenous switching mo del, Lee (1978), first selection rule
Variables Stayers Migrants Migration
Constant 1.281 (0.625) 4.734 (0.936) 0.641 (0.393)
education 0.047 (0.017) 0.033 (0.027) -0.045 (0.024)
age 0.094 (0.027) -0.028 (0.047) -0.037 (0.007)
age squar. -0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001)
male -0.239 (0.193) -0.437 (0.395) 1.003 (0.132)
married -0.317 (0.133) -0.106 (0.302) 0.253 (0.148)
male*married -0.029 (0.133) 0.027 (0.298)
Occupations:
Managers 0.669 (0.136) 0.902 (0.233)
Lower man. 0.240 (0.134) 0.562 (0.236)
Skilled worker 0.367 (0.114) 0.301 (0.197)
Self-employed 0.545 (0.121) 0.693 (0.187)
Other paid job 0.310 (0.118) 0.254 (0.197)
For. currency -0.230 (0.282) 0.681 (0.236)
Live in cities 0.247 (0.119)
Live North -0.365 (0.171)
lambda -0.758 (0.326) -0.497 (0.397)
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Table A5: Endogenous switch ing m o del, Lee (1978), second selection rule
Variables Stayers Migrants Migration
Constant 1.487 (0.561) 4.536 (0.912) 0.717 (0.413)
education 0.045 (0.015) 0.025 (0.026) -0.049 (0.024)
age 0.089 (0.025) -0.030 (0.047) -0.037 (0.007)
age squ. -0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001)
male -0.170 (0.167) -0.234 (0.345) 0.975 (0.133)
married -0.293 (0.120) -0.038 (0.300) 0.219 (0.150)
male*married -0.031 (0.127) -0.014 (0.304
Occupations:
Managers 0.676 (0.130) 0.900 (0.235)
Lower man. 0.237 (0.128) 0.571 (0.238)
Skilled worker 0.377 (0.109) 0.299 (0.198)
Self-employed 0.548 (0.117) 0.691 (0.188)
Other paid job 0.322 (0.113) 0.261 (0.199)
For. currency -0.259 (0.267) 0.686 (0.239)
Live in cities 0.267 (0.121)
Live North -0.421 (0.176
Muslim -0.126 (0.117)
Dependents 0.095 (0.051)
lambda -0.599 (0.265) -0.251 (0.319)
Table A6: Mean and Counterfactual mean incomes f or diﬀerent charact eristics
Migrants (204 cases) Mean Counterfactual
Educ Age Wage Marg Cond. Marg Cond.
col.1 col.2 col.3 col.4
row 1 <14 all 1 5.02 4.45 4.13 3.86
2 >14 all 1 5.42 4.66 4.36 4.01
3 <14 all 0 4.93 4.36 4.03 3.77
4 >14 all 0 5.14 4.40 4.23 3.89
5 <14 <30 1 4.86 4.40 3.98 3.77
6 >14 <30 1 5.38 4.74 4.30 4.01
7 <14 >30 1 5.15 4.50 4.24 3.93
8 >14 >30 1 5.45 4.60 4.41 4.02
Stayers (390 cases) Mean Counterfactual
Educ Age Wage Marg Cond. Marg Cond.
row 9 <14 all 1 4.10 4.28 5.12 5.52
10 >14 all 1 4.40 4.55 5.60 5.92
11 <14 all 0 4.11 4.27 5.12 5.48
12 >14 all 0 4.31 4.43 5.25 5.52
13 <14 <30 1 3.93 4.16 4.99 5.48
14 >14 <30 1 4.28 4.46 5.49 5.86
15 <14 >30 1 4.18 4.35 5.18 5.54
16 >14 >30 1 4.45 4.59 5.64 5.94
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Table A7: Absolute advantage for diﬀerent charact eristics, marginal
Stayers Migrants
col.1 col.2 col.3 col.4
low educ. high educ. low educ. high educ.
wage .10 .18 .03 -.04
self .19 .11 -.08 -.08
young .13 .11 .05 .02
old .03 .19 -.06 -.04
Notes: Absolute advantage is computed as the diﬀerence between
log hourly wages of stayers (migrants) and the counterfactual
mean earnings of migrants (stayers).
Table A8: Comparative advant age for diﬀerent charact eristics, marginal
Stayers Migrants
col.1 col.2 col.3 col.4
low educ. high educ. low educ. high educ.
wage -1.02 -1.20 .89 1.16
self -1.01 -.94 .90 .91
young -1.06 -1.21 .88 1.08
old -1.00 -1.19 .91 1.04
Notes: Comparative advantage are computed as the diﬀerence
between mean log hourly wages and the counterfactual
for each population.
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